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Public Resource Allocation, Strategic Behavior, and Status Quo Bias in Choice 
Experiments  
 
Abstract 
Choice experiments, a survey methodology in which consumers face a series of choice tasks 
requiring them to indicate their most preferred option from a choice set containing two or more 
options,  are used to generate estimates of consumer preferences to determine the appropriate 
allocation of public resources to competing projects or programs.  The analysis of choice 
experiment data typically relies on the assumptions that choices of the non-status quo option are 
demand-revealing and choices of the status quo option are not demand-revealing, but rather, 
reflect an underlying behavioral bias in favor of the status quo.  This paper reports the results of 
an experiment which demonstrates that both of these assumptions are likely to be invalid.  We 
demonstrates that choice experiments for a public good are vulnerable to the same types of 
strategic voting that affect other types of multiple-choice voting mechanisms.  We show that due 
to the mathematics of choice set design, what is actually strategic voting is often interpreted as a 
behavioral bias for the status quo option.  Therefore, we caution against using current choice 
experiment methodologies to inform policy making about public goods. 
 
Keywords: choice experiment, strategic voting, status quo bias, public goods experiment 
JEL codes: H41, C91, C92 
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Public Resource Allocation, Strategic Behavior, and Status Quo Bias in Choice 
Experiments 
1. Introduction 
This paper cautions against the increasing use and dominance of the choice experiment 
method to generate estimates of the benefits from public policies and programs.  “Choice 
experiments (CEs),” a survey method used to estimate consumer preferences, were initially 
developed and are widely used in the context of private goods for the fields of marketing and 
transport to study consumer preferences and predict market shares for new products (e.g. 
Louviere and Woodworth, 1983; Louviere, 1984, 1988; Revelt and Train, 1998; Brownstone and 
Train, 1999; McFadden, 2001; Hensher, Rose and Greene, 2015).  However, the methodology 
was soon applied to informing public programs and policies in the environment and health 
domains, whose outputs are largely, or solely, public goods (e.g. Australian Energy Market 
Operator, 2014; Cameron and DeShazo, 2013; Emmerson and Metcalfe, 2013; Queen’s 
University Belfast and Perceptive Insight, 2015).  Choice experiment mechanisms can take a 
variety of forms such as one-shot or repeated choice tasks.  On each choice task, participants are 
presented with a choice set containing two or more choice options from which they must choose 
one option.  In order to be consistent with market settings in which consumers always have the 
option not to purchase, in most choice experiments, one of the options in each choice task will 
always be a ‘no purchase’ (in CEs for private goods) or ‘status quo’ (in CEs for public goods) 
option.  Figure 1 reports example choice tasks from choice experiment surveys used in three very 
different settings: to estimate the demand for quality-differentiated beef (Lusk and Schroeder, 
2004); to determine the public’s preferences for the use of public lands for endangered species 
protection vs. military training (Smith and McKee, 2007); and to estimate  
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Figure 1. Sample Choice Tasks from Choice Experiment Surveys  
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preferences for a cervical cancer screening program (Ryan and Wordsworth, 2000).  The 
common features of these choice tasks are (1) Choice options which are described in terms of 
their characteristics, termed attributes, which vary across options; (2) The inclusion of more than 
two options from which respondents may choose; (3) The inclusion of a price or cost attribute for 
each option (which enables researchers to estimate willingness to pay); and (4) The inclusion of 
a no purchase/no policy change (status quo) option.  Due to the gains in statistical efficiency of 
preference estimates that result from asking respondents to choose from more than two options 
and presenting respondents with more than one choice task (both of which generate more 
information about each respondent’s preferences, resulting in greater statistical efficiency), most 
choice experiment surveys employ the repeated multiple choice mechanism, in which 
participants complete a series of choice tasks similar to those presented in Figure 1.  As 
respondents proceed through the tasks, the characteristics of the purchase/non-status-quo options 
change, while the characteristics of the no purchase/status quo option remain the same.  Using 
logit-based econometric techniques (McFadden, 1986, 2001), researchers can use respondents’ 
stated choices to estimate respondents’ willingness to pay for a good or policy  as well as their 
marginal willingness to pay for the attributes of a good or policy.  
Although we might expect to obtain reliable preference estimates in the private goods 
domain, the application of the choice experiment domain to the public goods environment is 
potentially problematic.  In particular, the possibility of strategically biased preference estimates 
in the public goods environment has been neglected in the literature to date.  One of the most 
common biases in choice experiments that researchers have found is apparent over-choice of the 
no purchase/status quo option (e.g. Collins and Vossler, 2009; Adamowicz et al., 2011), termed 
status quo bias.   This apparent bias in favor of the status quo option can significantly reduce the 
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estimated value of the public good (Adamowicz et al., 1998), potentially resulting in 
misallocations of public resources.  Although there exist multiple explanations for the source of 
this bias in the literature,1 as well as econometric methods (Adamowicz et al., 1998) to adjust 
benefit estimates for the presence of status quo bias, none of these studies considers the role that 
the underlying incentives of the choice mechanism in a public goods environment may play in 
generating bias.  This may be due to the inherent difficulties involved in identifying strategic 
behavior in field survey data. 
This paper takes the choice experiment out of the field and into the laboratory in order to 
establish whether choice experiments can generate unbiased estimates of the benefits from public 
goods. By taking this approach, we are able to demonstrate unambiguously that choice 
experiments for public goods are vulnerable to the same type of strategic voting that occurs in 
multi-candidate elections.  Strategic choices fall on the second-best option which, because of the 
mathematics of combinatorial choice set design2, is the status quo option in a disproportionate 
number of choice tasks.  The experimental results demonstrate that it is inappropriate to interpret 
the results from choice experiments as either fully demand-revealing, or as demand-revealing 
with an adjustment for status quo bias.  Both interpretations of choice experiment data can result 
in biased estimates of preferences for public goods, and thus misallocations of public resources.  
Because of this potential problem, we argue that current choice experiment methods to value 
public goods should be used with caution. 
                                                          
1 See, for example: List et al. (2006); Taylor et al. (2010); Carlsson et al. (2007); Bateman et al. (2008); Collins and 
Vossler, 2009; Day and Pinto-Prades, 2010; Day et al. (2012), and Aravena et al. (2014). 
2 By the “mathematics of combinatorial choice set design,” we mean the method by which individual choice options 
with different levels of attributes are combined into groups of options, termed choice sets.  During a choice 
experiment survey, respondents are presented with a series of choice tasks, in which they are asked to choose one 
option out of each choice set.  Their choice is usually interpreted to indicate which option in the set they most prefer.  
6 
 
We provide three forms of support for this argument: (1) Well-known results from the 
theoretical and applied literature on strategic voting demonstrating voters’ incentives to vote for 
their second favorite option in races involving three or more candidates; (2) A mathematical 
model that demonstrates how the mathematics of combinatorial choice set design can result in 
choice experiments in which a large fraction of choice tasks contain the status quo option as the 
second-best choice; and (3) Evidence from an experiment based on three fractional factorial 
designs that demonstrates that behavior in such choice experiments is consistent with the 
predictions of voting theory.  The remainder of this paper lays out the argument by presenting 
the theoretical and mathematical models in section 2, the experimental design in section 3, the 
results in section 4, and concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. Theory and Simulations 
2.1 Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections 
As the theory of voting is well-known, we provide only a brief summary of it here.  
Farquharson (1969) provides a comprehensive overview of the topic.  Consider a group of n 
agents voting on the choice of a public program or policy.  Suppose that agents choose from 
three discrete public goods, 𝑔𝑔 ∈ {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶}.  Each agent i has a complete, reflexive, and transitive 
preference ordering over the three proposed programs, which can be described by a utility 
function ui(g).  In order to determine which program to provide, the public agency holds a vote.  
Each agent i casts a vote vi(g).  Under a plurality voting rule, the agency’s decision rule is to 
provide the public program which receives the most votes, g*.  Thus, each agent’s problem is to 
choose their vote vi(g) to maximize their utility, ui(g), conditional on the distribution of votes of 
the other group members.  In the case of uniform priors, in which agent i believes that the other 
group members’ votes are distributed equally across the three outcomes, agent i’s best response 
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is to vote for his or her most preferred option.  In this case, agent i’s vote is demand revealing.  
However, if agent i has non-uniform priors about the distribution of other votes, they may have 
the incentive to vote for an option other than their most preferred option.  For example, if agent 
i’s preferences are such that ui(A) > ui(B) > ui(C), but their priors are that: 
  ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗(𝐶𝐶) > ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗(𝐵𝐵) > ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗(𝐴𝐴)𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖          (1) 
then agent i can potentially improve their utility by voting for their second most-preferred option 
rather than their most preferred option, in order to prevent their least-preferred option from 
winning.  In such cases, agent i’s vote is not demand revealing. 
Strategic voting of this type is perhaps the most well-known result of voting theory.  It 
has been demonstrated to occur in laboratory settings under conditions of full information about 
the distribution of the preferences of the other voters (Felsenthal et al., 1988; Forsythe et al., 
1993) and in field settings in which voters have only partial information about the distribution of 
other voters’ preferences (Fujiwara, 2011; Kawai and Watanabe, 2013).  Given that the incentive 
structure of each choice task in a choice experiment mechanism for a public good is identical to 
that of a multi-candidate election, it is reasonable to expect that a similar type of strategic voting 
might take place in choice experiment surveys.  We demonstrate below that due to the 
mathematics of combinatorial choice set design, strategic votes for the second best option are 
likely to be disproportionately for the status quo option. 
2.2. Combinatorial Choice Set Design and the Second-Best Option 
We begin with a few definitions: 
Definition 1: A choice experiment is a survey in which a respondent faces a series of choice tasks 
such as the ones illustrated in Figure 1.  On each choice task, the respondent faces a choice set 
from which s/he must select one option. 
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Definition 2: A choice set is a group of two or more choice options.  The number of options in 
the choice sets illustrated in Figure 1 ranges from three (for the land use and health studies) to six 
(for the beef study) options.  In most choice experiment surveys, including the ones illustrated in 
Figure 1, one of the choice options is typically the no purchase/status quo option. 
Definition 3: A choice option is a version of the good that the respondent may choose.  Each 
choice option is described in terms of the amount of each attribute that it possesses.  Choice 
options in Figure 1 include five different types of steak and a no purchase option, two alternative 
land use policies along with a keep current policy (status quo) option, and two alternative cancer 
screening program options along with a no screening option. 
Definition 4: An attribute is a characteristic of a good.  The amount of an attribute that a good 
possesses may be described using discrete or continuous numerical values.  The cost or price of 
an option is usually an attribute in order to facilitate the estimation of a respondent’s willingness 
to pay.  In Figure 1, the attributes of the steaks are limited to their price and a descriptor of their 
quality (e.g. Guaranteed Tender).  The attributes of the land use policy include the cost of each 
policy per household and the impact of the policy on species survival and soldiers’ readiness 
(both of which can take on levels of low, medium, or high).  Attributes of the cancer screening 
program include the time between smears, the time to obtain results, chance of being recalled, 
chance of an abnormality being discovered, chance of dying from cervical cancer, and the cost.   
In the derivation that follows, we consider fundamental principles of attribute-balanced 
choice set design applied to choice experiments for public goods.  An attribute balanced choice 
set is a choice set in which every choice option is described using the same number of attributes, 
and each attribute has the same number of possible levels.  In Figure 1, the choice sets in the land 
use study are attribute-balanced.  The mathematical results below easily generalize to choice sets 
9 
 
in which different attributes have different numbers of possible levels.3  In choice sets in which 
each of m attributes has n levels, there are nm possible choice options which can be combined 
into choice sets.  One of more of these options are combined with the status quo/no purchase 
option (whose attributes are fixed) to create a choice set.  To illustrate the effect of this choice set 
design process, we let π represent the proportion of the non-status-quo choice options that are 
preferred by the voting public to the status quo.  We make the simplifying assumption that all 
voters have the same value of π.  The result generalizes to the more realistic assumption that 
there is a distribution of values of π across the voting population.  Therefore, given the values of 
n, m, and π, πnm choice options are preferred to the status quo option, and (1 – π)nm choice 
options are not preferred to the status quo.   
A choice experiment in which respondents face a sufficient number of choice tasks that 
they see all the possible combinations of choice options in choice sets of a given size is termed a 
full factorial choice experiment.  We consider a full factorial choice experiment in which on each 
choice task, respondents must choose from a three-option choice set consisting of two options 
plus the status quo.  We focus our analysis on this type of choice experiment both because it is 
the simplest choice experiment design in which the choice tasks contain more than two options, 
and because choice experiment designs of this type are commonly used in applied public goods 
settings (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007).   In a full factorial choice experiment in which each choice 
set contains two options plus the status quo, there are nm(nm – 1) total possible choice sets.  In 
(πnm)(πnm – 1) of these choice sets, the status quo will be the least-preferred option.  In [(1 – 
π)nm][(1 – π)nm – 1] of these choice sets, the status quo will be the most-preferred option.  This 
leaves: 
                                                          
3 A proof of this generalized result is available from the authors. 
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Number of Attributes (m) 
N
um
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r o
f 
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ls
 (n
)  2 3 4 
2 0.833 0.786 0.767 
3 0.781 0.760 0.753 
4 0.767 0.754 0.751 
 
Table 1. Proportion of choice sets with status quo as first-best or second-best option when 
π = 0.5 
 
 nm(nm – 1) – { πnm(πnm – 1) + [(1 – π)nm][(1 – π)nm – 1]}                      (2) 
choice sets in the full factorial design in which the status quo option is the second-best option.  In 
the limit (as either 𝑛𝑛 → ∞ 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑚 → ∞), the ratio of this number to the total number of choice sets 
is 2π(1 – π).  Furthermore, the limiting fraction of total possible choice sets in the full factorial 
design in which the status quo is either the most-preferred or second-most-preferred option is (1 
– π2).   
2.3. Calculations and Simulation Results 
This derivation demonstrates that the status quo is likely to land in the first-best or 
second-best position in a large fraction of choice sets.  In a full factorial choice experiment in 
which half the options are preferred to the status quo and half are not (π = 0.50), the status quo 
will reside in the first-best or second-best position in (1 – (0.5)2) = 75% of the choice sets.  This 
result is for large values of n or m and all possible choice sets.  Table 1 reports the proportion of 
choice sets in which the status quo option is first-best or second-best for small values of n or m 
when π = 0.5.  The results in Table 1 demonstrate that the limiting case is reached very quickly. 
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Figure 2. Sample Choice Set from Simulation Exercise 
Typically, field choice experiments do not employ full factorial designs, as these would 
require respondents to complete an inordinate number of choice tasks.  Choice experiments 
which use a subset of the choice sets from the full factorial design are termed fractional factorial  
choice experiments.  We employ three techniques to derive fractional factorial choice experiment 
designs from the full factorial to examine the extent to which the predictions of the mathematical 
model for the full factorial design hold for fractional factorial designs.  We derive designs for 
choice experiments containing 12 choice tasks in which the choice sets are either utility balanced  
 (UBAL) (Huber and Zwerina, 1996), orthogonal on the attribute level differences (OOD, 
Kanninen, 2002; Street et al., 2005), or randomly drawn (RAND) from the full factorial design.  
Each option in each choice set has three attributes, one of which is the cost, and each attribute 
has two possible levels.  The status quo option contains baseline levels of each attribute at no 
cost.  Figure 2 illustrates a sample choice set used in the simulation.  In order to generate a 
simulated voter’s rank-ordering of the options in a choice set, we assume the following utility 
function: 
Utility  = (Marginal value of attribute A × Units of attribute A) + (Marginal value of attribute B 
× Units of attribute B) – Cost 
By varying a voter’s marginal values of the attributes in the equation above, we can vary the 
value of π and calculate a voter’s simulated utility for each choice option, as well as their rank-
ordering of each choice option in each choice set.  Table 2 reports the results of the simulations,  
and demonstrates that the mathematical predictions based on the value of π applied to a full  
Option 1  Option 2   Option 3 (current portfolio) 
1 unit of A  2 units of A   1 unit of A 
3 units of B  1 unit of B   1 unit of B 
Cost = 5  Cost = 10   Cost = 0 
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 Fraction of Choice Sets in Which the 
Status Quo is Second-Best 
Fraction of Choice Sets in Which the 
Status Quo is First- or Second-Best 
 π = 0.125 π = 0.50 π = 0.75 π = 0.125 π = 0.50 π = 0.75 
Full Factorial Prediction: 
n = 2, m = 3 0.25 0.57 0.43 1.00 0.79 0.46 
Full Factorial Prediction: 
Limiting Case 0.22 0.50 0.38 0.98 0.75 0.44 
OOD Fractional Factorial 
Choice Experiment 
Design 
0.25 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 
UBAL Fractional 
Factorial Choice 
Experiment Design 
0.08 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.75 0.42 
RAND Fractional 
Factorial Choice 
Experiment Design 
0.17 0.67 0.42 1.00 0.75 0.50 
 
Table 2. Full-Factorial Predictions of Fractions of Choice Sets Containing Status Quo as Second-
Best or First- or Second-Best Option vs. Actual Results for Fractional Factorial Choice 
Experiment Designs 
factorial design are reasonable estimates of the fraction of choice sets in a fractional factorial 
design that will contain the status quo as the second-best or first-best or second-best option. 
Although the status quo option is likely to land in the second-best position in a large 
percentage of choice sets, voters only have the incentive to cast non-demand revealing votes for 
the second-best option if they have non-uniform priors about the distribution of other votes.  In 
order to examine whether this second condition is satisfied, we employ the orthogonal on the 
attribute level differences (OOD) choice experiment design from the simulations above, and ask 
what would be the distribution of preferences over choice options in each choice set if the 
distribution of π were uniform.  Table 3 reports the results of this exercise.  Uniform distributions 
of voter preferences over choice options are clearly not the norm, which means that it may not be 
reasonable to assume that voters have uniform priors about the distribution of votes.  Thus, the 
conditions necessary for strategic voting appear to be present in choice experiments, and as a 
result of the mathematics of combinatorial choice set design, many of the strategic votes are  
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Choice Set Share who Prefer 
Option 1 
Share Who Prefer 
Option 2 
Share Who Prefer 
Status Quo 
1 0% 57% 43% 
2 86% 0% 14% 
3 86% 0% 14% 
4 0% 57% 43% 
5 71% 0% 29% 
6 14% 29% 57% 
7 0% 86% 14% 
8 29% 14% 57% 
9 0% 71% 29% 
10 29% 14% 57% 
11 0% 71% 29% 
12 57% 0% 43% 
 
Table 3. Distribution of voter preferences assuming a uniform distribution of π 
likely to be for the status quo option, which will frequently fall in the second best position in a 
choice set. 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1 Rules of the Game 
The experiment is designed to simulate a field choice experiment.  In the experiment, 
subjects in groups of nine, which remain the same for the entire experimental session, vote on a 
series of twelve ballots for a public good, which for the purposes of the experiment is 
characterized as a group investment for which earnings vary across subjects.  Each ballot  
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contains a choice set containing three options.  Each option has two attributes and a cost.  There 
are two possible levels of each attribute and the cost.  We reserve additional details about the 
choice sets for the following section on induced values. 
The order of ballots is randomized across subjects.  Subjects complete each ballot one by 
one, and submit them to the experimental moderator.  All ballots are cast privately, and each 
subject only sees the information on his or her own ballot.  After the twelve rounds of voting are 
completed, one ballot is randomly selected from among the twelve to be binding using the roll of 
a 12-sided die.  The votes on the binding ballot are counted and a plurality voting rule is applied, 
so that the choice option on the binding ballot with the most votes wins.  Two-way ties are 
resolved using the toss of a fair coin, and three-way ties are resolved via the roll of a fair six-
sided die.  The winning option is announced, and subjects compute their earnings for the winning 
option using the formula: 
Earnings = 6 + (Marginal value of attribute A × Units of attribute A) + (Marginal value of 
attribute B × Units of attribute B) – Cost 
Subjects know all of the rules of the game at the beginning of the experiment.  Each subject 
knows that other members of the group may face a different set of choice options on any given 
ballot and that other subjects may also have different marginal values for each attribute, but no 
subject knows the overall distribution of marginal values or possible choice options.  Figure 3 
presents a sample ballot. 
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Figure 3. Sample Experimental Ballot 
3.2. Choice Set Designs 
Each choice option contains three attributes (A, B, and Cost) with two levels.  Attribute A 
has possible levels of 1 or 2, Attribute B has possible levels of 1 or 3, and the Cost is either 5 or 
10.  This design is the simplest possible design that mimics a field choice experiment.  A full 
factorial choice experiment design contains 23 = 8 possible choice options which can be 
combined into 56 possible multiple choice sets containing two different options and the status 
quo option.  The status quo option contains 1 unit of attribute A, 1 unit of attribute B, and is 
available at zero cost.  
In order to test whether behavior is different in different types of choice experiment 
designs, we employ three methods to reduce the number of choice sets from the full factorial: 
orthogonality on the attribute level differences (OOD) (Kanninen, 2002; Street et al., 2005), 
utility balance (UBAL) (Huber and Zwerina, 1996), and random (RAND).  In an OOD choice set 
BALLOT 
 
Your value of A is: 3 
Your value of B is: 7 
 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 (current portfolio) 
1 unit of A  2 units of A  1 unit of A 
3 units of B  1 unit of B  1 unit of B 
Cost = 5  Cost = 10  Cost = 0 
 
Please select which option you wish to vote for below: 
    □ Option 1 
□ Option 2 
□ Option 3 
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in which each attribute has only two levels, if one attribute of one option in the set has the high 
level, that same attribute in the other option in the choice set will be assigned the low level.  
Thus, the smallest possible choice experiment that results from a 23 factorial design is one 
containing 12 choice sets.  For consistency, choice experiments designed using the random and 
utility balanced methodologies also contain 12 choice sets.  Normally, to create utility-balanced 
choice sets, the designer would have to make assumptions regarding which choice options are 
likely to be considered better or worse by respondents in order to generate the property of utility 
balance.  In an induced-value setting, subjects’ induced utility for each choice option is known 
via the earnings equation above.  Thus, we create a different set of utility-balanced choice sets 
for each set of induced values.  All choice set designs are reported in the supplemental materials. 
3.3. Induced Values 
The experimental design incorporates three sets of induced values, corresponding to 
values of π of 0.125, 0.50, and 0.75.  Table 4 reports the marginal values of attributes A and B 
associated with each value of π.   
The combination of three methods to create fractional factorial choice experiment designs 
and three sets of induced values results in nine experimental conditions.  Within an experimental 
session, which could contain up to 27 participants, subjects are randomly assigned to a group  
of nine that play either the OOD, UBAL, or RAND version of the choice experiment.4  Within a 
group of nine, each subject is randomly assigned an induced value.  Subjects are blinded to the 
method by which their choice sets were created, the induced values of the other individuals in  
 
                                                          
4 If the number of subjects who showed up was not divisible by nine, the unassigned subjects were invited to 
participate in a different experimental session at a later time.  Prior to starting the experiment, all subjects completed 
an informed consent process.  Subjects were free to leave at any time. 
17 
 
π Marginal value of attribute A Marginal value of attribute B 
0.125 3 2 
0.50 3 7 
0.75 11 7 
 
Table 4. Induced Values 
their group, and the overall distribution of induced values.  Moderators are also blinded to the 
distribution of induced values in the group.  Two hundred and seventy student volunteers from a 
U.S. university participated in the experiment, resulting in a sample of 30 subjects for each 
choice experiment design-induced value combination.  Since each subject votes 12 times, this 
results in a total of 360 observations per choice experiment design-induced value combination, or 
1080 total observations for each choice experiment design methodology.  The experiment takes 
40-45 minutes to complete, and average experimental earnings are $15-$20.5 
4. Results and Discussion 
The results to be reported demonstrate that (1) Strategic voting occurs in choice 
experiments for public goods; (2) Strategic votes for the status quo option happen a predictable 
percentage of the time; and (3) Most choices of the status quo option are not examples of status 
quo bias, but rather, are demand-revealing.  As a consequence, it is inappropriate to interpret the  
data from choice experiments as either fully demand revealing, or as subject to a behavioral bias 
in favor of the status quo.  Public policy choices informed by analyses based on either of these 
two assumptions may result in inefficient allocations of public resources.  In the discussion that  
                                                          
5 The experiment was conducted under the oversight of the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).  All 
experimental instructions are available in the online supplementary materials.  Experimental data are available from 
the corresponding author upon request. 
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 Mean Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Int. 
By Method to Create Fractional Factorial Choice Set Designs 
OOD 0.79 0.051 [0.69, 0.89] 
UBAL 0.82 0.050 [0.72, 0.92] 
RAND 0.83 0.046 [0.74, 0.92] 
By Fraction of Choice Options Preferred to the Status Quo (π) 
π = 0.125 0.87 0.035 [0.80, 0.94] 
π = 0.50 0.79 0.048 [0.70, 0.89] 
π = 0.75 0.73 0.064 [0.61, 0.86] 
 
Table 5. Fraction of Non-Demand Revealing Votes for the Second-Best Alternative 
 
follows, all p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at the individual subject level 
to account for within-subject correlation of errors.       
4.1 Result 1: Strategic voting occurs in choice experiments for public goods. 
One hundred fourteen subjects (42% of all subjects) cast at least one vote for the second-
best option in a choice set during the experiment.  As reported in Table 5, votes for the second-
best option constitute over 70% of all non-demand revealing votes in the experiment.  
Conditional on a vote being non-demand revealing, there are no significant differences in the 
fractions of votes for the second-best alternative across choice experiment design treatments 
(0.55 ≤ p ≤ 0.90). Subjects with low values of π are significantly more likely than other subjects 
to vote for the second-best option (p < 0.01).  There are no other significant differences in the 
nature of non-demand revealing behavior across subject types.   
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Figure 4. Frequency of number of second-best votes per subject 
 
Figure 4 reports the frequency of the total number of second-best votes cast by individual 
subjects.  The vast majority of subjects who cast second-best votes cast one or two votes for the 
second-best option out of a possible 12.  Subjects tend to vote for the second-best option when 
there is a very bad third option in a choice set.  Including the status quo option, there are nine 
possible choice options which can be combined into choice sets.  Figure 5 reports the ranking out 
of 9 of the worst option in each choice set for those ballots for which non-demand revealing 
votes for the second-best alternative were cast.  When subjects cast a non-demand revealing vote 
for the second-best alternative, 65% of the time the ballot contained a third option which ranked 
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Figure 5.  Ranking (out of 9) of the worst option in a choice set when a non-demand 
revealing vote for the second best option was cast 
 
7th, 8th, or 9th out of the possible nine alternatives.  Seventy-nine percent of these ballots 
contained a third choice alternative which fell in the bottom half of the ranking.  The result that 
most non-demand revealing votes are for the second-best option combined with the result that 
these votes tend to occur when there is a bad third option in the choice set, and tend to be cast 
more often by the π = 0.125 subjects who have many more bad options in their choice sets 
demonstrate that non-demand revealing behavior is not random, but rather follows a pattern 
consistent with a model of strategic voting. 
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The overall rate of strategic voting in the experiment is 8%.  This rate of strategic voting 
is well within the range of rates of strategic voting previously observed in the laboratory (as high 
as 50%, as reported in Felsenthal et al., 1988, and Forsythe et al., 1993) and in the field (1.2%, as 
reported in Kawai and Watanabe, 2013).  In most laboratory studies of strategic voting, subjects 
have complete information about the distribution of other voters’ preferences, giving full 
information about non-uniform priors and making the incentives for strategic voting completely 
transparent.  Obviously, such information is not available to voters in the field.  In this 
experiment, subjects have complete information about their own preferences (as in other lab 
studies), but must form their own priors about the distribution of preferences of other members 
of the group (as in field studies).  Given that this experimental design contains elements of both 
the lab and the field, it is not surprising to observe rates of strategic voting that are consistent 
with and between previous lab and field results. 
4.2. Result 2: Strategic votes for the status quo option happen a predictable percentage of the 
time.   
        The first five rows of Table 6 report the predicted fractions of votes for the second-best 
option that are the status quo option.  The last three rows of Table 6 show the observed fraction 
of second best votes which are for the status quo. By comparing the last three rows to the rows 
above them, it is possible to examine the extent to which strategic votes for the status quo are 
consistent with the mathematical predictions based on the value of π.   
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 Fraction of Choice Sets in Which the 
Status Quo is Second-Best  
 π = 0.125 π = 0.50 π = 0.75 
Full Factorial Prediction: n = 2, m = 3 0.25 0.57 0.43 
Full Factorial Prediction: Limiting Case 0.22 0.50 0.38 
OOD Fractional Experimental Design 0.25 1.00 0.50 
UBAL Fractional Experimental Design 0.08 0.33 0.33 
RAND Fractional Experimental Design 0.17 0.67 0.42 
Experimentally Observed Fraction of Second-Best Votes for the Status Quo 
Observed: OOD Experimental Results 
(Robust SE) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
1.00 
(N/A) 
0.40 
(0.15) 
Observed: UBAL Experimental Results 
(Robust SE) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
0.47 
(0.18) 
Observed: RAND Experimental Results 
(Robust SE) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.80 
(0.16) 
0.39 
(0.10) 
 
Table 6. Predicted and Observed Votes for Second-Best Options that are the Status Quo Option 
 
Subjects may deviate from these predictions by casting a second-best vote for the status 
quo more often than predicted by the model, or less often, depending on when they choose to 
cast votes for a second-best option.  If they are casting second-best votes more often in choice 
tasks in which the status quo is not in the second-best position, the observed fraction of second-
best votes for the status quo option will be less than predicted by the value of π.  If they are 
casting second-best votes more often on choice occasions where the status quo is in the second-
best position, then the observed fraction of second-best votes for the status quo will be greater 
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than predicted by the value of π.  Both outcomes are observable in Table 6.  The choice tasks on 
which subjects may choose to cast second-best votes depends on a subject’s priors and how bad 
the third alternative is for them, which varies across choice sets and by value of π.  The 
exceptions to this are the OOD choice sets for π = 0.50 subjects.  Since all of the OOD choice 
sets contain the status quo in the second-best position, all second-best votes are necessarily for 
the status quo alternative.  The key message of Table 6 is, with the exception of the UBAL 
treatment, the fraction of second-best votes for the status quo is generally consistent with the 
mathematical predictions based on the value of π.  Thus, strategic votes for the status quo as the 
second-best option happen a predictable percentage of the time.   
4.3. Result 3: Most choices of the status quo option are not examples of status quo bias, but 
rather, are demand-revealing choices.   
Table 7 reports the overall rates of demand revelation by choice experiment design 
methodology and π.  Although there are some differences in rates of demand revelation by 
choice experiment design6, the main message of the table is about how demand revelation differs 
by value of π.  Overall, subjects who have low values of π are significantly less likely to cast a 
demand revealing vote than other subjects (p = 0.03 for π = 0.125 vs. 0.50; p = 0.02 for π = 0.125 
vs. 0.75).  These subjects prefer the status quo to most of the other available choice options, and 
have many bad options in the choice sets that they face.  These are precisely the subjects whom 
voting theory predicts are likely to vote strategically, which is what we observe in Table 7.   
 
 
                                                          
6 The overall rate of demand revelation is significantly less in the UBAL treatment than the OOD treatment (p = 
0.02).  There are no other significant differences in rates of demand revelation across methods to create fractional 
factorial choice experiment designs. 
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 Mean Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Int. 
By Method to Create Fractional Factorial Choice Experiments  
OOD 0.93 0.015 [0.90, 0.95] 
UBAL 0.87 0.019 [0.83, 0.91] 
RAND 0.90 0.019 [0.86, 0.93] 
By Fraction of Choice Options Preferred to the Status Quo (π) 
π = 0.125 0.85 0.024 [0.81, 0.90] 
π = 0.50 0.92 0.015 [0.89, 0.95] 
π = 0.75 0.92 0.016 [0.89, 0.95] 
 
Table 7. Rates of Demand Revelation 
 
By Method to Create Fractional Factorial Choice Experiments 
OOD 0.89 0.037 [0.81, 0.96] 
UBAL 0.95 0.026 [0.90, 1.00] 
RAND 0.93 0.027 [0.87, 0.98] 
By Fraction of Choice Options Preferred to the Status Quo (π) 
π = 0.125 0.99 0.003 [0.99, 1.00] 
π = 0.50 0.84 0.048 [0.75, 0.94] 
π = 0.75 0.56 0.079 [0.41, 0.72] 
 
Table 8. Fraction of Status Quo Votes that are Demand Revealing 
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Although the results demonstrate that strategic votes for the second-best option fall on the 
status quo option in a predictable fraction of choices, it is also the case that most votes for the 
status quo option are not strategic, but rather, are demand-revealing.  Table 8 reports the fraction 
of status quo votes that are demand revealing.  This fraction differs significantly (p < 0.01 for all 
differences) by a subject’s value of π in exactly the direction predicted by the mathematics of 
combinatorial choice set design. Those subjects who have very few choice options that are better 
than the status quo (those with π = 0.125) frequently cast demand-revealing votes for the status 
quo, while those who have many choice options that are better than the status quo (π = 0.75) cast 
demand-revealing votes for the status quo much less often.  Out of 1031 total votes for the status 
quo, 954 are demand-revealing.  Of the 77 votes that remain, 54 (70%) are strategic votes for the 
status quo when it is the second-best option in the choice set.  Thus, only 23 votes for the status 
quo, out of a total of 1031 total status quo votes cast, appear to exhibit what we might term 
“status quo bias.”  Thus, when the incentives of the choice mechanism are accounted for, status 
quo bias appears to be a rare phenomenon in choice experiments for a public good. 
5. Conclusion 
Moving from the laboratory to the field, the results reported above have clear 
implications for any application of choice experiment data in public decision-making.  When 
choice experiment data are analyzed to generate estimates of consumer preferences for use in 
determining the appropriate allocation of public resources to competing projects or programs, 
normally, the data analysis hinges on two assumptions: (1) choices of the non-status quo option 
are demand-revealing; and (2) choices of the status quo-option are not true reflections of 
underlying preferences, but rather, reflect an underlying behavioral bias in favor of the status 
quo.  These experimental results, which are robust to the types of choice experiment design 
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methodologies tested, demonstrate that both assumptions are likely to be invalid.  The only 
reason that non-demand revealing choices fall more often on the status quo option is because the 
status quo option appears in every choice set, and due to the mathematics of combinatorial 
choice set design, is likely to land in the first-best or second-best position in a choice set a large 
percentage of the time.  Because it is easier to distinguish choices of the status quo from other 
choices in the data, the apparent over-choice of the status quo has been interpreted to reflect 
behavioral bias on the part of consumers.  This experiment demonstrates that it is far more likely 
that consumers are making either a demand-revealing choice of their favorite option in the choice 
set, or a strategic choice of the second-best option in order to prevent a very bad third option 
from winning.  Failure to account for the incentive structures inherent in the multiple choice 
voting mechanism for public goods is likely to result in mis-estimation of preferences, and 
hence, misallocation of public resources.  Thus, we caution against the use of the choice 
experiment methodology as currently practiced to inform public policy decisions. 
Based on these results, we recommend that, in the future, researchers focus their attention 
on developing new mechanism designs that are free of the incentive properties that we describe 
above, or alternative methods to analyze choice data that exploits the information that is present 
in a respondent’s choice of the second-best option.    
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